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 Public water utilities are tasked with providing high quality, inexpensive water 
often sourced from watersheds representing a diverse mix of public and private land 
ownership. There is increasing recognition amongst water resource managers of the role 
that private landowners play in determining downstream water quality, but bringing 
together landowners with a wide variety of land management objectives under the umbrella 
of watershed stewardship has proven difficult. Recently, a large number of “Payment for 
Watershed Services” programs have aimed to engage private landowners in watershed 
stewardship initiatives by offering financial incentives for adopting watershed best 
management practices. However, a growing field of research suggests that financial 
incentives alone may be of limited utility to encourage widespread and long-standing 
behavior change, and instead understanding landowner attitudes and non-financial barriers 
to stewardship program enrollment has become a focus of research. 
 This research examines a population of rural landowners representing a diversity 
of agricultural, forestry, recreational, and investment objectives in the Clackamas River 
watershed, Oregon. I designed and distributed a mail and web-based survey instrument 
intended to measure land uses and land ownership objectives, attitudes towards watershed 
stewardship programs, barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs, and preferred 
incentives and goals that would promote enrollment. I received 281 valid responses for a 
response rate of 29%. I conducted two primary analyses: one focused on relating attitudes 
and barriers to intent to enroll in a watershed stewardship program, and one focused on 
identifying how diverse landowners differ according to factors influencing enrollment in 
stewardship programs. I found that landowners did not report financial considerations to 
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be a primary barrier to enrollment and expressed low interest in receiving financial 
incentives. Instead, landowners reported that primary barriers related to lack of trust, 
ecological understanding, and concerns that stewardship program enrollment would be 
incompatible with their land management objectives. I do not discount the potential utility 
of financial incentives under certain circumstances, but emphasize the importance of 
addressing these other considerations before incentives can make a meaningful impact.  
I compared how barriers to enrollment were perceived by landowners with different 
land management objectives relating to production, investment, and conservation. I found 
that landowner attitudes were differentiated from one another primarily by their use of land 
for production purposes; however, I found a large amount of diversity between producers 
and non-producers in the degree to which they considered investment and conservation 
objectives in their land management, and these two variables added further explanatory 
power to understanding fine-scale differences in how landowner typologies relate to 
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Spurred by the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments that required 
assessment of public drinking water sources, many public water utilities have established 
source watershed protection programs aimed at addressing upstream land uses to preserve 
downstream drinking water quality (Bennett et al. 2014). However, a substantial portion of 
drinking watersheds are in private ownership, and bringing together landowners with a 
diverse array of land management objectives under the umbrella of watershed stewardship 
has proven difficult. Private rural land uses may negatively impact water quality through 
storm water runoff laden with pesticides, excess nutrient loadings from fertilizers, and 
irrigation runoff that adds salts and other pollutants into water supplies (Halcrow et al. 
1982). Land conversion and deforestation may remove bank-stabilizing riparian 
vegetation, leading to increased soil erosion and suspended sediment in the water column, 
and the loss of shade in riparian zones may cause thermal pollution by exposing waterways 
to excess sunlight (Karr & Schlosser 1978). The results can pose serious threats to aquatic 
life and can substantially increase the cost of treatment for downstream drinking water 
(Freeman 2008). 
Despite the potential negative impacts of private rural land use, water resource 
managers increasingly recognize that many private landowners can and do act as watershed 
stewards through careful land management and protection of riparian zones (Ahnstrom 
2008, Engel et al. 2008). As a result, a growing number of source watershed protection 
programs have utilized a “payment for watershed services” (PWS) framework to provide 
financial incentives to encourage or reward stewardship behaviors (Bennett et al. 2014). 
Such behaviors may include a variety of watershed-friendly land management practices, 
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including maintenance or creation of riparian forests, nutrient load offsets, or wildfire 
mitigation activities (Bennett et al. 2014). 
Payment for Watershed Services is not a new idea. For decades, the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) has incentivized the use of riparian buffers through its 
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), and until 2014 promoted Wetlands 
Conservation through the Wetlands Reserve Program. Though not specifically focused on 
watersheds, funds from the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) have 
all been leveraged to assist landowners in implementation of best watershed management 
practices (Wood 1999). More recently, PWS programs have been established by water 
utilities primarily structured around protecting drinking water to remain in compliance with 
federal regulations and to avoid the construction of expensive treatment plants (Bennett 
2014). Lurie et al. (2013) argue that local water utilities can play a particularly effective 
role in promoting watershed stewardship because of their significant knowledge with the 
watershed’s social and ecological context. Notable examples of municipal PWS programs 
include the New York City Source Watershed Protection Program (New York), the Eugene 
Water and Electric Board’s Voluntary Incentives Program (Oregon), and the Raleigh 
Upper Neuse Clean Water Initiative (North Carolina). 
Despite the frequent use of incentives to promote stewardship behaviors, many 
incentive programs have been unable to achieve widespread enrollment and have been 
critiqued for providing insufficient payments to adequately compensate farmers (Engel 
2008). Furthermore, Pirard et al. (2010) noted that incentives may only lead to temporary 
behavior changes that may revert after payments have ended. While incentive programs 
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are intended to address financial barriers to land stewardship, they may not fully consider 
social factors, knowledge, and technological limitations (Ahnstrom 2008). Schneider and 
Ingram (1990) argue that knowledge of a population’s motivations, attitudes, and barriers 
towards a given action is vital to designing effective programs. While PWS programs 
address financial barriers, a growing body of research suggests that non-financial factors 
such as attitude, personal values, sense of place, or social obligation may play a greater and 
more durable influence on landowner land stewardship decisions.  
Research Overview 
This research is guided by three primary objectives: (1) to evaluate the efficacy of 
financial incentives to promote enrollment in stewardship programs, (2) to gain insight into 
the relationship between attitude and land stewardship, and (3) to offer recommendations 
regarding how resource managers can effectively engage the landowner populace. Given 
the large number of water utilities applying a PWS framework, this research is centered 
around understanding enrollment in non-governmental stewardship programs. I evaluate 
these questions through two chapters; the first investigates the relationship between intent 
to enroll in stewardship programs and attitudes relating to financial and non-financial 
considerations. The second explores how diverse landowners perceive different barriers to 
enrollment and prefer different methods to engage with stewardship programs. Both of 
these chapters are geared towards providing policy-makers additional insight into the range 
of policy tools available to apply given a variety of situations. 
The project focused on a specific group of rural landowners in the Clackamas River 
watershed, Oregon. While findings described in the following chapters provide further 
evidence regarding the diversity of attitudes and land management objectives represented 
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by landowners, these findings are intended to be applied primarily to source watershed 
protection of the Clackamas River watershed. If one conclusion can be readily made from 
this research, it is that understanding the social intricacies of place is absolutely vital to 
designing sustainable and equitable land stewardship programs.  
Context  
The Clackamas River is the center of a 243,000 hectare watershed characterized by 
a patchwork of agricultural, semi-urban, and forested lands. Eight separate drinking water 
utilities draw drinking water from the Clackamas River and supply water to over 300,000 
customers in Washington and Clackamas counties. While the upper 72% of the watershed 
is publically owned land primarily in the Mount Hood National Forest, the downstream 
portion of the watershed is almost entirely in private agricultural, forestry, and residential 
ownership. As such, the watershed offers a complex system representative of a diverse 
range of landowners for which to explore these research questions.  
In order to maintain water quality amidst increasing development pressure and 
production intensity, Clackamas County and the relevant water utilities have formed a 
consortium known as the Clackamas River Water Providers (CRWP) to implement source 
watershed protection measures (CRWP 2010). The CRWP have noted that the application 
of agri-chemicals poses a significant threat to drinking water quality; the United States 
Geologic Survey has identified over 1,200 known contaminants in the watershed 
(Carpenter 2008), and 17 potentially harmful pesticides have been detected at significant 
levels throughout the watershed (Schmidt 2012). Additionally, loss of riparian shade and 
excess thermal loads have been identified as priority issues in the watershed (CRWP 2010) 
and recently gained media attention due to record water temperatures recorded throughout 
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the basin (Roth 2015). In their 2010 Drinking Water Protection Plan, the CRWP outlined 
the need to work with both commercial and small acreage rural landowners in a program 
to promote watershed stewardship. This study is aimed at informing the creation of such a 
program by understanding attitudes and barriers to enrollment.  
Survey Development and Implementation 
The primary data used in this research were collected through a questionnaire-based 
survey of rural landowners in the Clackamas River watershed. The survey instrument was 
designed to measure attitudes and beliefs regarding watershed stewardship, to educate 
respondents on the range of features that watershed stewardship programs could take 
specific to the Clackamas River watershed, and to identify the diversity of land 
management objectives represented in the watershed. The survey was developed with 
assistance from the CRWP and was reviewed by resource managers familiar with the 
survey sample, including officials representing local water utilities, the Oregon Department 
of Agriculture, the United States Geological Survey, and the local Soil and Water 
Conservation District.  
The questionnaire was administered via mail and web to a randomly selected group 
of 1,030 private rural landowners within the Clackamas River watershed. Landowners were 
considered eligible if their property was (1) outside of the Urban Growth Boundary; (2) at 
least 2 acres in size; (3) zoned as agricultural, rural, or forestry land; and (4) no more than 
100 feet from a stream at the property border (Figure 0.1). Because nursery operations have 
been noted as a particular concern to water quality in the Clackamas River watershed 
(Schmidt 2012), any nursery operating within the watershed was considered eligible and 
was contacted to participate in the survey. To enhance response rate (Dillman 2000), 
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landowners were contacted four times from August to September, 2015, via the Dillman 
Tailored Design Method, which included an initial postcard, followed up by a first round 
of questionnaires, a reminder postcard, and a second wave of questionnaires for non-
respondents. 
 
Figure 0.1  
The Clackamas River watershed in Oregon's Willamette River Basin. Eligible tax parcels refer to taxlot 
parcels outside of the urban growth boundary, greater than 2 acres in size, and within 100 feet of a 




Necessary but not sufficient: Attitudes as motivators and barriers to enrollment in 
watershed stewardship programs 
In this chapter, I build on past literature by evaluating the relationship between 
attitudes, perceived barriers, and land management objectives relating to enrollment in 
watershed stewardship programs. I investigate this question through a survey of private 
rural residential, agricultural, and forestry landowners in the Clackamas River, OR, and I 
apply these findings to discuss policy recommendations to encourage watershed 
stewardship amongst landowners. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Schneider and Ingram’s well-cited paper “Behavioral Assumptions of Policy 
Tools” (1990) stresses that policy-makers may utilize a combination of authority, incentive, 
capacity-building, and symbolic tools dependent on local context. The authors argue that 
effective use of these tools begins with understanding the relevant population’s motivations 
for and barriers to performing the desired action, and to recognize that behavior is 
influenced by an individual’s longer-term objectives. Accordingly, PWS programs have 
been critiqued for assuming that landowners are limited only by financial considerations, 
and monetary incentives are sufficient to promote widespread and long-lasting behavior 
change (Engel et al. 2008, Pirard et al. 2010). Coupled with relatively low enrollment rates 
in similar programs like the Conservation Reserve Program (Stubbs 2014), these critiques 
have prompted a number of researchers to investigate the broader suite of attitudes, 




1.1 Attitudes as Motivators of Stewardship 
Attitude refers to an individual’s favorable or unfavorable appraisal of a behavior 
or object in question (Ajzen 1991) and has frequently been used to understand private 
landowner motivations for stewardship behaviors. Positive attitudes towards conservation 
have been linked with higher program enrollment rates (Ahnstrom 2008), the adoption of 
best management practices (Beedell and Rehman 2009, Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012), and 
increased success per unit of money invested (Coleman et al. 1992).  
Many landowner studies have utilized Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) as a useful framework for understanding how attitudes relate to the adoption of 
conservation behaviors (Beedell and Rehman 1999, Corbett 2002, Rosenberg and 
Margerum 2008, Ahnstrom 2008, Armstrong and Stedman 2012, Baumgart-Getz et al. 
2012, Thompson et al. 2014). The TPB suggests that a behavior can be understood by 
examining three components of attitude: (1) beliefs about the outcome of the behavior, (2) 
perceived norms regarding the adoption of the behavior, and (3) the perceived behavioral 
control to complete the behavior (Ajzen 1991). Behavior itself is often measured as intent 
to perform an action. Though intent does not necessarily correspond directly to observable 
behavior, it offers a useful proxy when observed behavior data is not available. Measures 
for perceived behavioral control have had relatively low success at explaining stewardship 
behavior (e.g. Beedell and Rehman 1999, Corbett 2002), and some have gone so far as to 
question whether this concept offers a useful distinction from the other components of 
attitude (Trafimow and Duran 1998). Attitudes regarding behavioral outcomes and 
social/personal norms, on the other hand, offer more fruitful grounds on which to 
understand stewardship behaviors.  
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The landowner literature suggests beliefs regarding a behavior’s outcome for both 
the environment and oneself influence stewardship behavior. Armstrong and Stedman 
(2008) noted the belief that implementation of riparian buffers would lead to improved 
watershed outcomes was a key predictor of rural landowner intent to perform that action, 
and Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) reviewed a number of studies and noted that more general 
concepts of environmental attitude and awareness may also help predict behavior. 
Conversely, Woods et al. (2014) studied a group of producers and noted the importance of 
believing that watershed stewardship behaviors would provide personal financial benefit, 
whereas behaviors without a perceived personal benefit were perceived less favorably.  
Behavioral alignment with social and moral norms is another important component 
relating to attitude. The perceived norms of neighbor actions (Fischer and Charnley 2012), 
the social norm regarding appearance of a property (Chin et al. 2008), and membership in 
social networks (Reimer and Prokopy 2014) have all been related with landowner 
stewardship action. Ryan (2009) found that moral norms of stewardship ethic and self-
accountability for water quality were closely associated with stewardship activities of non-
commercial riparian landowners.  
Despite the large number of studies investigating the relationship between attitude 
and the decision to adopt stewardship practices, few look specifically at how landowner 
attitudes impact the decision to enroll in stewardship programs. Baumgart-Getz et al. 
(2012) analyzed 46 studies relating to farmer adoption of best management practices in the 
United States, and only two were specifically focused on factors influencing program 
enrollment. This is a significant gap given that stewardship programs are a necessary 
medium through which landowner behavior change is encouraged. Of the studies that do 
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focus on enrollment in stewardship programs, the vast majority are heavily focused on 
government-sponsored programs (e.g. Esseks and Kraft 1988, Napier et al. 1988, Corbett 
2002, Song et al 2014, Reimer and Prokopy 2014). Because government skepticism tends 
to influence opinions in the United States (Steel et al. 1994), it is necessary to distinguish 
how attitudes relate to enrollment in the growing number of non-government programs 
sponsored by drinking water utilities. 
1.2 Attitudes as Barriers to Stewardship 
While many related studies have been framed around investigating how attitudes 
motivate stewardship, it appears that attitudes may also act as substantial barriers to 
enrollment in stewardship programs. Kahnemen and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory 
provides a strong rationale for consideration of barriers in attitudes modeling. Prospect 
theory suggests that individuals make decisions based on perceived losses or gains relative 
to their current position, and individuals are more sensitive to losses than they are to gains. 
This may suggest that negative attitudes regarding the outcomes of stewardship programs 
more have a more potent impact on intent than positive attitudes. As evidence of the 
importance of considering attitudes as barriers, landowners have reported support for 
environmental and water quality goals in a variety of contexts without correlating directly 
to stewardship behavior (e.g. Carr and Tait 1991, Ryan et al. 2003, Greiner et al. 2009). 
Evaluation of attitudes as barriers is particularly important given that negative attitudes 
have been shown to drive up transaction costs beyond the assessed value of the stewardship 
action in question (Grolleau and McCann 2012). 
Practical considerations such as perception of financial limitations, knowledge 
barriers, and time constraints may partly explain low adoption of stewardship behaviors 
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(Williams 2002, Woods et al. 2014). However, less tangible attitudes relating to lack of 
trust in conservation agencies and concerns for loss of private property rights show much 
more distinct and consistent negative relationship with stewardship behavior in the 
literature (Greiner et al. 2009, Kallstrom and Ljung 2005, Armstrong and Stedman 2011). 
In particular, a lack of trust in government appears to be a particularly important barrier to 
stewardship (Rosenberg and Margerum 2008, Smith et al. 2013). More broadly, Ma et al. 
(2010) included a catch-all measure in the belief that programs are incompatible with land 
management goals, and found a significant negative relationship with stewardship 
behavior.  
1.3 Land Management Objectives  
A substantial amount of research suggests that attitudes towards stewardship are 
ultimately colored by a landowner’s objectives for managing their land (Majumdar et al. 
2008, Greiner et al. 2009). Due to the large footprint of agricultural lands in the United 
States, production-based objectives are particularly heavily represented in the literature. 
Commonly, producers have been classified as either profit-maximizers or land stewards, 
with the notion that these objectives are mutually exclusive (Thompson et al. 2014). While 
some evidence supports this dichotomy (e.g. Carr and Tait 1991, Ryan et al. 2003), many 
farmers expres an interest in both profit-maximization and land stewardship, creating a sort 
of tension that can be difficult to resolve (Sullivan et al. 1996, Thompson et al. 2014). The 
complex relationship can be partly understood through a Dual Interest Theory framework, 
which suggests that intent to adopt conservation behaviors is driven by weighting the 
relative utility of profit objectives and other objectives (Sheeder and Lynne 2011). As 
described by Chouinard et al. (2008), “[Producers] may participate in these activities for 
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the social good or because they believe it is the ‘right thing to do’ even if it requires 
personal sacrifice.”  
While Dual Interest Theory has been less frequently applied to non-operator 
landowners, several studies have compared non-operator landowners with their operator 
counterparts and have come to seemingly contradictory conclusions that support 
application of this framework beyond the typical producer.  Kaplowitz and Witter (2008) 
found that non-commercial landowners were generally more environmentally aware and 
more likely to implement riparian buffers on their property, whereas Armstrong and 
Stedman (2011) compared a similar population, and found that residential landowners were 
generally less willing to implement buffers due to aesthetic preferences. Such findings 
suggest that non-operator landowners are also characterized by diverse motivations. 
Despite the lack of consensus, it is clear that whether a landowner relies on their land for 
income or not plays an important distinction in how they engage with stewardship 
behaviors.   
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 While the existing literature has provided a wealth of evidence that attitudes and 
land management objectives influence the adoption of land stewardship practices, I aimed 
to investigate these concepts in conjunction with one another as part of a conceptual model 
to understand intent to enroll in stewardship programs. Based on my literature review, I 
compare the relationship between attitudes as motivators and barriers of intent to enroll in 
stewardship programs. Because of the low explanatory power associated with perceived 
behavioral control, I focus this study on attitudes relating to outcome evaluation and social 
and moral norms. I evaluate how production and environmental land management 
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objectives color intent to enroll, with the 
hypothesis that individuals interested 
primarily in profit will have more negative 
attitudes than individuals interested primarily 
in protecting the environment, and as a result 
will report a lower average intent to enroll 
(Figure 1.1).  
I place this study in a broader context 
by discussing my findings in light of Schneider 
and Ingram’s (1990) four classes of policy 
tools to address this population’s attitudes, 
barriers, and land management objectives 
relating to land stewardship. I conclude with 
some broadly applicable considerations for 
application in source watershed stewardship programs.  
2. METHODS 
Related to this study, I asked respondents to express their agreement or 
disagreement to statements representing attitudes hypothesized to either motivate or to act 
as barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs. I measured all responses to these 
statements using variations of a 5 point Likert Scale (Likert 1932). Motivating attitudes 
were measured by asking respondents to rate degree of agreement or disagreement with (1) 
statements regarding interest in receiving incentives to enroll and (2) statements regarding 
belief in positive outcomes to both the environment and to self. Barrier attitudes were 
Figure 1.1. A conceptual model of how land 
management objectives and attitude relate to 
intent to enroll in stewardship programs.    
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measured by asking respondents to rate degree of agreement with (1) statements regarding 
perceived barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs and (2) statements regarding 
belief in negative outcomes to both the environment and to self. Land management 
objectives were measured by asking respondents to rate the importance profit/production 
objectives and environmental objectives from “not at all important” to “very important.” 
Positive and negative outcome beliefs were measured utilizing a modified version of the 
Awareness of Consequences and Environmental Concern scale (Stern et al. 1994).  
After respondents had completed a series of questions pertaining to potential 
program features, the survey asked, “Now that you know a little bit more about the potential 
features of a watershed conservation program in the Clackamas River watershed, how 
likely would you say you are to participate in such a program if the program was tailored 
to your responses above?” This question was designed to measure behavioral intent to 
participate in a stewardship program and was used as the dependent variable in my 
analyses.  
2.3 Data Analysis 
All analyses were performed in R Studio (Version 3.2.3). Because the population 
contained both rural residential and agricultural properties, I compared demographics and 
property characteristics from respondents to both the most recent National Agricultural 
Statistics Service Census of Agriculture (USDA 2012) for Clackamas County and the most 
recent American Community Survey (US Census Bureau 2009-2013) for census tracts 
represented in the study area. 
I investigated polychoric correlations between variables (‘Psych’ R Package, 
Revelle 2015) in order to avoid potential issues with multi-collinearity. Polychoric 
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correlations are a modified version of the Pearson correlation coefficient used when an 
ordinal variable is theorized to represent an underlying normally distributed variable (see 
Drasgow 1988) as is the case with Likert-scale data. Highly correlated variables that held 
face validity were consolidated into single indices by taking the mean of component 
variables. All indices were evaluated for internal consistency using Chronbach’s alpha 
(Chronbach 1951).  
Though the independent variable – intent to enroll in a watershed stewardship 
program – was initially based on a 5-item Likert scale, I transformed this variable to a 
dichotomous scale represented by 1 (likely or very likely to enroll) or 0 (not sure, unlikely, 
or very unlikely to enroll). I chose this route because my question ultimately was to identify 
factors distinguishing the split between likely and unlikely participants, and logistic 
regression offered the most statistically robust and easily interpretable technique to 
accomplish this goal. Furthermore, logistic regression does not hold strict assumptions 
regarding normality and continuity of data, making it appropriate for use with Likert data.  
To evaluate the effect of attitudes as both motivators and barriers to enrollment in 
stewardship programs, I created two separate logistic regression models – an “attitudes as 
motivators model” utilizing variables hypothesized to encourage enrollment intent, and an 
“attitudes as barriers model” utilizing variables hypothesized to discourage enrollment 
intent. I assessed model significance by performing a chi-square test against a null model 
and by calculating the Nagelkerke R2. I weighed variable importance by calculating the 
odds ratio for each variable, and I evaluated these models for issues with multi-collinearity 




Following the creation of the initial two models, I performed a stepwise model 
reduction on each based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a measure of relative 
model quality (Akaike 1973). At each step in this iterative process, the variable most 
negatively influencing model quality as evaluated by AIC is dropped before the reduced 
set of variables is reevaluated. Following this reduction procedure, remaining variables 
from each model were put together into a combined model representing both motivator and 
barrier variables. Another stepwise AIC reduction was performed on the combined model 
to establish a final model representing the variables explaining the greatest amount of 
variance in the dataset.  
To evaluate the hypothesized effect land management objective on attitude, I 
measured three variables representing profit/production and three variables representing 
environmental objectives. I consolidated these into variables into indices by taking the 
three-item mean and confirmed the validity of these indices by examining correlations 
between variables and calculating Chronbach’s alpha. First, I checked if either of these 
variables related to intent to enroll on their own. Then, I weighed these two variables 
against one another by taking the difference between the two indices and creating a new 
variable termed “land management orientation.” Theoretically, this variable represents 
individuals who consider environmental objectives more important than profit/production 
objectives by positive values and individuals with inverse objectives by negative values. 
Based on this variable, I split the sample into three classes of landowners: Profit/Production 
Oriented, Neutrally Oriented, and Environmentally Oriented. I then utilized the final 
attitudes model to evaluated how these groups differ in predicted enrollment intent. I 
compared how these groups differed relating to each variable represented in the combined 
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attitude model using a Tukey HSD test (Tukey 1949), and evaluated how this relates to 
intent to enroll by comparing differences in predicted intent to enroll as defined by the 
combined model.  
3. RESULTS 
Seventy-two surveys (6.5%) were returned as undeliverable, leading to an effective 
sample of 958. I received 279 valid responses – a 29% response rate. Compared with the 
reference data sources, the sample tended to be older (median age 63) and more educated 
(48% with a college degree). Property size, agricultural sales, gender, and income tended 
to fall within the range of values represented by the reference sources (Table 1.1).  
Table 1.1  
Summary of demographic and property characteristics of survey respondents.  
 
3.1 Data Summary 
I was able to consolidate measured variables into simplified indices to reduce the 
total number of variables used in the attitudes modeling. Inter-variable correlations 
revealed two constructs within the measured attitude items: “Financial Incentives” (alpha 
= 0.92) represents four variables expressing interest in receiving monetary incentives, 
whereas “Social Barriers” (alpha = 0.71) represents three variables expressing the influence 
of one’s neighbors or community to prevent enrollment. The highest rated motivator 
attitudes were the beliefs that functioning stream ecosystems are important for a clean 
water supply (the Ecosystem Belief, mean = 4.35), that watershed conservation benefits 
Sample Size 281 Median Age (Years) 63  
Median Property Size (Acres) 19.3 % Male 64.2%  
% College Graduate 47.6% % Conservative 48.1%  
% Without Sales in 2014 58.8% % Liberal 27.0%  
% With Sales > $1000 in 2014 31.9% % Income > $75K 56.5%  
 18 
 
everyone in the watershed (the Universal Benefit Belief, mean = 3.75), and that watershed 
conservation is the right thing to do (the Moral Belief, mean = 3.72). Respondents 
frequently cited practical barriers to enrollment, including the perception of insufficient 
information (Informational Barriers, mean = 3.83), finances (Financial Barriers, mean = 
3.23) and time (Time Barriers, mean = 3.12). Furthermore, many respondents reported less 
concrete concerns that enrollment could lead to regulatory implications (Regulatory 
Barriers, mean = 3.73) and they lacked trust in conservation agencies or organizations 
(Trust Barriers, mean = 3.32). Generally, individuals reported more positive attitudes 
towards watershed stewardship than they did negative attitudes, but they also were more 
likely to report perceived barriers compared with expressing an interest in receiving 
incentives to enroll (Table 1.2).  
My analysis confirmed the existence of two distinct land management objectives: 
Profit/Production Objectives (alpha = 0.86) and Environmental Objectives (alpha = 0.82) 
(Table 1.2). Profit/Production Objectives represented three variables relating to the 
importance of producing farm or timber products, providing income, and managing a 
business through land production. Environmental Objectives represented three variables 
relating to the importance of protecting open space and aesthetic beauty, the health of 
waterways, and native wildlife and vegetation. Environmental Objectives (mean = 4.11) 
were reported much more frequently than Profit/Production Objectives (mean = 2.53). 
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Table 1.2  
Summary of single-item and indexed variables representing attitudes as motivators, attitudes as barriers, 
and land management objectives. Bolded items were utilized in logistic regression. The groupings represent 
responses to the following questions: (Panel A) “Would the following increase your interest in working with 
a watershed conservation program?” (Panel B) “In general, do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements regarding watershed conservation in the Clackamas River watershed?” (Panel C) “To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about why you might NOT participate in a 
watershed conservation program?” (4) “How important are the following factors when you are making 
decisions regarding your land?”  
 














Marketing: Improved marketing for products from my land (n=251) 2.67 1.30 
Technical Assistance: Staff to help you implement your project (n=252) 3.17 1.35 
Financial (alpha = 0.92) (n=256) 3.20 1.21 
Annual cash incentives for participating (n=255) 3.42 1.35 
Mean One-time cash bonus for signing up (n=254) 3.25 1.34 
A cash bonus for joint participation with neighbors (n=253) 3.07 1.33 















Universal Benefit: Watershed conservation benefits everyone (n=251) 3.75 1.12 
Moral: Watershed conservation is just the right thing to do (n=249) 3.88 1.01 
Public Health: The effects of water pollution on public health are worse than we 
realize (n=249) 3.72 1.10 
Responsibility: Pollution from my land harms people downstream (n=250) 2.62 1.50 
Degradation: Development threatens water quality (n=247) 3.62 1.19 
Ecosystem: Functioning ecosystems are important for clean water (n=248) 4.35 0.81 















Time: I don't have time to participate in a program like this (n=247) 3.12 1.15 
Financial: My finances won't allow it (n=248) 3.23 1.10 
Informational: I don't know enough about these programs (n=248) 3.83 1.15 
Social (alpha = 0.71) (n=246) 2.63 0.87 
My neighbors or community would give me a hard time (n=244) 2.45 1.04 
 No one in my community participates in these types of programs (n=244) 2.61 0.92 
I'm uncomfortable with the attention programs like these bring (n=246) 2.80 1.24 
Trust: I don't trust the organizations that run these programs (n=244) 3.32 1.20 















Incompatible: Conservation programs are incompatible with my goals (n=263) 2.46 1.12 
Threat to livelihood: Watershed conservation will threaten my livelihood 2.40 1.15 
Restrictive: Watershed conservation might limit my personal freedoms (n=250) 3.25 1.25 
Denial: While some local areas may have seen declines in water quality, overall 
water quality in the watershed is not in decline (n=249) 
2.86 1.03 









Profit / Production (alpha = 0.86) (n=262) 2.53 1.39 
Produce high quality farm or timber products for market (n=259) 2.75 1.70 
Provide income for me and my family (n=260) 2.53 1.50 
Grow/manage a business through my land's production (n=256) 2.25 1.46 
Environmental (alpha = 0.82) (n=267) 4.11 0.96 
Preserve open space or aesthetic beauty (n=262) 3.98 1.23 
Protect the health of waterways on or near my property (n=264) 4.21 1.05 
Protect local wildlife or native vegetation (n=266) 4.14 1.04 
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3.2 Logistic Regression Models 
The attitudes as motivators model revealed three variables that held a significant 
positive relationship (α<0.1) with intent to participate: Technical Assistance Incentives 
(p<0.001), the Universal Benefit Belief (p=0.034), and the Ecosystem Belief (p=0.008) 
(Table 1.3). Stepwise AIC reduction revealed no additional variables contributing to model 
quality. The Ecosystem Belief had the highest odds ratio (odds=2.557), indicating that the 
model was particularly sensitive to this variable. The model was highly significant when 
compared against the null model (p<0.001, Nagelkerke R2=0.411). 
The attitudes as barriers model revealed three variables to hold a significant 
negative relationship (α<0.1) with intent: Trust Barriers (p=0.086), the Incompatible Belief 
(p<0.001), and the Threat to Livelihood Belief (p=0.061) (Table 1.3). Stepwise AIC 
reduction suggested that Time Barriers (p=0.193) and Social Barriers (p=0.112) contribute 
to model quality, and so these variables were maintained for inclusion in the combined 
model. The Incompatible Belief had the lowest odds ratio (odds=0.498), indicating that 
intent seemed to be particularly sensitive to this variable. The model performed similarly 
to the encouraging factors model and was highly significant compared against the null 




Logistic Regression model output comparing motivator, barrier, and combined models (*p < 0.1). 
 




















Marketing Incentives -0.204 0.173 0.240 1.619 0.816  
Technical Assistance 0.713 0.195 0.000* 1.579 2.040 ✓ 
Financial Incentives 0.214 0.198 0.279 1.490 1.238  
Universal Benefit Belief 0.437 0.206 0.034* 1.379 1.548 ✓ 
Moral Belief 0.255 0.254 0.315 1.578 1.291  
Public Health Belief -0.152 0.210 0.467 1.507 0.859  
Responsibility Belief 0.152 0.124 0.222 1.183 1.164  
Degradation Belief -0.252 0.186 0.174 1.428 0.777  
Ecosystem Belief 0.988 0.371 0.008* 1.357 2.686 ✓ 


















l Time Barriers -0.251 0.193 0.193 1.439 0.778 ✓ 
Financial Barriers -0.112 0.196 0.570 1.394 0.894  
Social Barriers -0.383 0.241 0.112 1.211 0.682 ✓ 
Trust Barriers -0.282 0.164 0.086* 1.183 0.754 ✓ 
Informational Barriers 0.032 0.161 0.842 1.085 1.033  
Incompatible Belief -0.684 0.180 0.000* 1.135 0.505 ✓ 
Threat to livelihood Belief -0.315 0.169 0.061* 1.167 0.729 ✓ 
Restrictive Belief 0.053 0.163 0.747 1.363 1.054  
Denial Belief -0.131 0.192 0.494 1.207 0.877  















Time Barriers -0.302 0.175 0.085* 1.039 0.740 ✓ 
Trust Barriers -0.325 0.169 0.054* 1.090 0.723 ✓ 
Incompatible Belief -0.425 0.192 0.027* 1.094 0.654 ✓ 
Threat to Livelihood Belief -0.423 0.171 0.013* 1.080 0.655 ✓ 
Technical Assistance 0.638 0.173 0.000* 1.075 1.893 ✓ 
Ecosystem Belief 0.653 0.310 0.035* 1.087 1.922 ✓ 
Model Comparison n df p-val (χ2) Nagelkerke R2 
Motivator Attitude 220 210 1.11E-12* 0.411 
Barrier Attitude Model 222 212 3.41E-11* 0.369 
Combined Attitude 217 210 2.20E-16* 0.476 
 
The combined attitude model contained six variables consisting of Time Barriers 
(p=0.085), Trust Barriers (p=0.054), the Incompatible Belief (p=0.084), the Threat to 
Livelihood Belief (p=0.013), Technical Assistance Incentives (p<0.001), and the 
Ecosystem Belief (p=0.035). This combined model was highly significant (p<0.001) and 




For these six variables, I developed partial regression probability curves that isolate 
the impact of each variable by outputting predicted probabilities for that variable while 
holding all other variables constant at their mean. Amongst the variables I found to 
significantly explain intent to enroll, each performed substantially better at explaining a 
lack of intent to enroll rather than intent to enroll; amongst respondents who reported 
negative attitudes, the model uniformly predicted an intent to enroll of near 0 (Figure 1.2). 
Likewise, the positive attitude variables never predicted a probability of enrollment greater 
than 50%, but not holding positive attitudes almost guaranteed a total lack of intent to 
enroll. 
 
3.3 Land Management Orientation 
I classified 23 respondents as “Profit/Production” oriented (Land Management 
Orientation < 0), 83 respondents as “Neutral” (0 > Land Management Orientation < 2) 
and 103 respondents as “Environmental” (Land Management Orientation > 2) (Figure 
1.3.1). Neutral individuals were classified as such because, despite having a slight edge 
Figure 1.2  
Partial regression 
curves for the six 
attitude variables 
represented in the 
combined model. 
Note that these 
represent the 
influence of each of 
these variables on 
intent to enroll with 
all other variables 




towards environmental objectives, they tended to fall in the middle of the respondent 
distribution and thus represented no strong land management orientation compared with 
the rest of the population.  
Figure 1.3.2 shows the cumulative distribution of predicted enrollment probability 
for each of the three groups. The Tukey HSD test between groups showed a significant 
difference between the Environmental and Neutral groups (p=0.011) and between 
Environmental and Profit/Production groups (p=0.001). However, I did not detect a 
difference in predicted intent to enroll probability between the Neutral and 
Profit/Production groups (p=0.210). In general, I noted an increasing average predicted 
enrollment intent from profit/production to neutral to environmental groups, and this 
matched trends seen in the observed data.   
 
Figure 1.3 
(1) Kernel density distribution of Land Management Orientation, split by group. (2) Cumulative 
distribution curve of predicted probabilities as a function of attitude compared between land 
management orientation groups. Significant differences between groups (Tukey HSD α<0.05) are 






Mean and standard error bars of combined model variables by land management orientation (n = 208). 
Significant differences between groups (Tukey HSD α<0.1) is indicated by associated letters A, B, and C.  
 
When comparing differences between groups for each variable, I found that 
Profit/Production oriented landowners were the most likely (α<0.1) to perceive Trust 
Barriers and to report the Incompatible Belief, followed by Neutral respondents and 
Environmental respondents. I found similar relationships in the perception of Time Barriers 
and the Threat to Livelihood Belief. Environmentally oriented landowners were 
significantly more likely to hold the Ecosystem Belief compared with Profit/Production 
oriented landowners. I found no difference between groups in relation to interest in 




Though response rate was lower than anticipated, it is not unprecedented for this 
population; a previous questionnaire of agricultural landowners in the watershed conducted 
by the Clackamas River Basin Council in 2013 used the same methods and reported a 
20.3% response rate. I found strong support for my initial conceptual model that attitudes 
can act as both motivators and barriers to enrollment in watershed stewardship programs. 
Furthermore, my findings support the hypothesis that land management objectives color 
attitudes that are relevant to enrollment intent. However, the relationship between land 
management objective, attitude, and enrollment intent was more complicated than I 
anticipated.  
Previous studies have noted a positive relationship between environmental 
objectives and stewardship practices (Greiner et al. 2009, Arbuckle et al. 2009). Though I 
found that many individuals reported a high importance of protecting the environment and 
local waterways through their land management, this did not correspond to intent to enroll 
in a watershed stewardship program. These findings indicate that respondents tended to 
consider protection of the environment to be a moral imperative to be completed by self-
initiative, rather than through a formalized program to accomplish this goal. One 
respondent noted, “We have always maintained [our land] by ourselves without outside 
help or interference.” These findings suggest that a lack of intent to enroll does not indicate 
an aversion to stewardship, but it appears that attitudes may prevent enrollment in 
stewardship programs.  
Likewise, I found no relationship between profit/production objectives and intent 
to enroll. McCann et al. (1997) reported a similar finding; they surveyed conventional and 
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organic farmers, and found no difference with regard to the percent of their incomes 
derived from farming. However, they did find a difference between environmental attitudes 
of conventional and organic farmers, suggesting that land management objectives may play 
an unresolved role in attitude. I examined this role by evaluating the relative importance of 
profit/production objectives and environmental objectives through the “land management 
orientation” index, and I found that when profit/production objectives took precedence 
over environmental objectives, attitudes were significantly more negative (Figure 1.4) and 
lead to a lower intent to enroll (Figure 1.3.2).  
Carr and Tait (1991) surveyed farmers in the UK, and found that profit/production 
motives tended to take precedence over environmental motives. My findings suggest that 
relatively few respondents (n=23) reported profit/production motives to be substantially 
more important than environmental motives; however, individuals who reported similar 
influences of profit/production and environmental motives were less likely to report 
enrollment intent compared with purely environmentally motivated individuals. This 
indicates that environmental and profit/production motives on their own are not 
prerequisite or exclusive of enrollment in stewardship programs, but the relationship 
between these variables can help to explain differences in attitude. Profit/production 
objectives appear to moderate the influence of environmental considerations and lead to a 
lower predicted enrollment intent.   
When I examined how attitudes relate to enrollment, I found that attitudes 
uniformly predict a lack of enrollment intent as opposed to intent; this suggests that 
attitudes are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that must be addressed in order to 
ensure enrollment. The application of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) may 
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offer an additional explanation of the relationship between attitude and intent. While I 
initially proposed the use of Prospect Theory as rationale for including negative attitudes 
in the model, my findings suggest that negative attitudes not only play an important role in 
influencing decision making, but in fact individuals seem to avoid action based on negative 
attitudes, whereas positive attitudes seem to have a less clearly defined relationship with 
behavioral intent. Interestingly, Ljung et al. (2012) found a similar concept to be true 
regarding attitudes towards hunting: negative attitudes universally predicted a lack of intent 
to hunt, but positive attitudes had little relationship to the act of hunting itself. Heberlein 
(2012) explains this phenomenon can be observed because possessing positive attitudes 
towards an action does not necessarily correspond to possessing the means to complete that 
action.  
It seems that holding each of the appropriate attitudes independent of one another 
is not enough, and as such program tools should aim to address these attitudes in 
conjunction with one another. In order to further elaborate which policy tools are likely to 
be useful in the context of these findings, I return to Schneider and Ingram’s (1990) policy 
tools to help understand effective means of engaging this population in watershed 
stewardship.   
Authority Tools prohibit or require action through enforceable regulation. Though 
I did not include regulatory concerns in the attitude model as this variable was unstable 
when included, respondents did tend to report this to be a significant barrier to enrollment. 
Regulatory tools have proven highly unpopular in similar contexts (Lurie et al. 2013), and 
Sullivan et al. (1996) reported lack of trust in the government to be a high concern amongst 
landowners. Despite informing respondents that the CRWP are not a regulatory body and 
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as such stewardship programs would not involve regulatory repercussions, there remained 
a high concern that enrollment would lead to regulatory implications.  
The models showed a negative relationship between the enrollment and the 
perception that stewardship programs would threaten the respondent’s livelihood, and I 
believe these concerns are primarily a concern for a loss of the lifestyle associated with 
using one’s land for production values. Similar studies of farmers have found a relationship 
between the farming livelihood and lifestyle qualities such as independence (Sullivan et al. 
l996) and closeness to nature (Schoon and Grotenhuis 2000). Kallstrom and Ljung (2005) 
found that when farmers felt that they had reduced control in decision making due to 
heightened regulation it threatened their ability to continue farming. As such, authority 
tools are likely a contentious method to encourage stewardship behavior, and stewardship 
programs should consider how to address this concern. For example, resource managers 
may work with federal and state regulators to institute a property rights assurances that 
participation will not lead to additional regulatory burden.  
Incentive Tools assume individuals are utility maximizers, and attempt to 
encourage or discourage voluntary behavior with financial or other tangible benefits. While 
the PWS framework has attempted to encourage voluntary program participation through 
financial incentives, my findings support the growing field of research that imply the 
limited ability of PWS programs to fully account for landowner behavior. While financial 
barriers were somewhat widely reported, I did not find a significant relationship between 
enrollment intent and the perception of financial barriers or interest in receiving financial 
incentives to participate. This may support the notion that watershed stewardship programs 
have overemphasized financial payments to promote behavior, or it may indicate that 
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respondents currently believe that they will be sufficiently compensated for enrollment. 
My findings support those reported by Ma et al. (2010), who described a conceptual model 
in which PES payments were considered as one of many tools to encourage enrollment, 
and demonstrated that for some farmers, payments simply will not change enrollment 
decision.  
My framing of financial considerations as a barrier may limit interpretation here. 
While financial barriers and assistance overcoming those barriers may not significantly 
improve enrollment, it is possible that financial incentives beyond covering basic 
stewardship costs could still improve enrollment. Reimer and Prokopy (2014) found that a 
“lack of perceived benefit” was a significant deterrent to participating; when financial 
incentives are sufficient to outweigh the perceived risks associated with program 
participation, it is possible that finances may act as motivators. However, large financial 
incentives require substantial capital investment, and my findings imply that other tools 
should be considered first as a means to alter attitude and to lower such high transaction 
costs. 
Capacity Tools assume individuals will partake in an action given the removal of 
barriers, and as such these tools involve the provision of training and resources to enable 
individuals to perform an action. My results suggest two primary barriers that may be 
addressed through capacity tools: the belief that stewardship programs are “incompatible” 
with a landowner’s goals for his/her land and the belief that landowners did not have 
enough time to participate in such a program. Ma et al. (2010) reported a similar finding 
that perception of incompatibility amongst a strictly farm population was a key limitation 
to enrollment in stewardship programs. Individuals may be financially and technically 
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capable of participation, but if these programs are seen as an inconvenience, landowners 
have little rationale to join.  
Interestingly, I found that individuals who were responsive to receiving technical 
assistance through a dedicated staff member who can help to implement program strategies 
were significantly more likely to participate. This makes sense – some individuals will not 
participate because they simply do not have the time to engage in an activity that is 
incompatible with their primary land management objectives. However, receiving 
technical assistance can help to overcome this hurdle. 
Symbolic Tools assume individuals are motivated by internal judgments and 
beliefs, and as such these tools attempt to showcase how a given policy direction is 
consistent with an individual’s attitudes.  My study focused on the importance of attitudes 
and provides further empirical support for the utilization of symbolic policy tools to 
encourage behavior. Amongst attitudes, I found lack of belief that functioning stream 
ecosystems are important for clean water (the Ecosystem Belief) and a lack of trust in 
conservation agencies (Trust Barriers) to be important deterrents to enrollment.  
While individuals widely reported the Ecosystem Belief, those that did not hold this 
belief were much less likely to enroll. This item is distinguished from other environmental 
attitude items in that it focused on the outcomes of protecting ecosystem health rather than 
the causes of ecosystem degradation. In another survey of rural landowners, Armstrong 
and Stedman (2011) found a similar relationship; they failed to detect a relationship 
between knowledge of water quality issues and intent to implement riparian buffers, but 
they identified a strong relationship with belief in positive outcomes of buffer 
implementation. This may suggest that, regardless of beliefs about the state of watershed 
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degradation, individuals must first believe that protecting environmental attributes of the 
watershed will lead to tangible improvements in water quality.  
I found the perception of Trust Barriers to be a highly significant deterrent to 
enrollment intent. Smith et al. (2013) described the importance of trust between individuals 
and conservation agencies related to shared values and moral and technical competencies 
– the belief that agencies can make ethically grounded decisions based on the best available 
science. In one study, farmers reported lack of credibility of extension offices and NRCS 
programs – often citing that these programs were underfunded, behind the times, and too 
focused on expensive “special projects” (Woods et al. 2014). Another study noted that 
farmers frequently felt excluded from meaningful engagement with conservation programs 
and that the responsible agencies discounted farmer knowledge regarding the land 
(Harrison et al. 1998). Some studies have suggested that conservation program outcomes 
can be improved through social connections between individuals and other landowners 
(Armstrong and Stedman 2011), or with conservation organizations (Flitcroft et al. 2009, 
Muradian 2010). In these instances, conservation programs were successful because they 
established relationships and larger social norms within the community. As a result, I 
suggest that building trust between source water protection organizations and the local 
community is a vital first towards program success. An alternative route may include 
working through existing trusted organizations (such as local soil and water conservation 
districts, watershed councils, or producer organizations) within the community who have 
firmly established working relationships with landowners.  
Surmounting initial barriers to enrollment will be difficult; respondents in the study 
were highly averse to program enrollment when negative outcomes were perceived, and 
 32 
 
yet positive attitudes did not guarantee intent to enroll. To help overcome such aversion, 
Lurie et al. (2013) suggested that enrollment may be encouraged by offering short term 
contracts to allow landowners to participate on a trial basis, after which a more long-term 
contract may be signed. Such trial programs may offer a key window in which relationships 
can be built and the key attitudes of trust, ecological understanding, and perceptions of 
incompatibility can be addressed. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study represents landowners in a unique social, ecological, and political 
landscape, and while my general critiques of PWS and emphasis on consideration of 
alternate policy tools may be broadly applicable, my results re-affirm the importance of 
community-based knowledge as a prerequisite to program success. There are likely few, if 
any, universally significant independent variables to explain stewardship program 
enrollment, and I join other authors who have called for the study of specific landowner 
populations rather than grouping all landowners together (Greiner et al. 2009, Woods et al. 
2014). I suggest that stewardship programs should allow sufficient flexibility to adapt not 
only to the entire population, but when possible to each individual landowner’s needs and 
objectives. 
Studying the relationship between attitudes and stewardship program enrollment is 
crucial not only because watershed-scale stewardship actions are mediated through 
stewardship programs, but program enrollment has been linked with long term changes in 
attitude (Wilson and Hart 2001). Provided that these changes in attitude are positive, 
overcoming initial barriers to enrollment can be an important first step towards fostering a 




Stewardship Program Engagement with Diverse Landowners 
In the previous chapter, I found evidence that land management objectives 
influence attitude and stewardship intent. In this chapter, I dive deeper into this concept by 
identifying distinct groupings of landowners dependent on their primary land management 
objectives and creating typologies based on these objectives. I discuss key divisions in 
perceived barriers to enrollment in stewardship programs between these typologies, as well 
as how these typologies differ in their preferred incentives and management actions 
relating to watershed stewardship.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Watersheds often are comprised of a large number of landowners with diverse 
interests and objectives for their land. In these cases, private landowners are the necessary 
mediators by which downstream water quality is determined (Ahnstrom et al. 2008), and 
understanding these objectives is crucial to engage these landowners in watershed 
stewardship. In recent years, rising rates of exurban development have added additional 
complexity and challenges to these landscapes, replacing large swaths of agricultural and 
timber lands with amenity-driven rural landowners (Brown et al. 2005). These land use 
changes have had important consequences for the both the ecological functioning of rural 
landscapes as well as the dominant methods by which private lands are managed (Dale et 
al. 2005).  
Despite the rising rates of complexity in land ownership, most federal conservation 
programs remain geared towards commercial agricultural and timber landowners. Many of 
these programs rely on the classic agricultural economics assumption that operator 
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landowners inherently make decisions based on the net profitability of these choices 
(Koontz 2001), and as such are structured around offering financial incentives to promote 
desired land management behaviors (e.g. Conservation Reserve Program, Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program). While I have previously argued that such programs are not a 
panacea for promoting stewardship amongst financially-motivated land operators, they 
may be particularly problematic as a means to encourage behavior amongst the growing 
numbers of landowners who do not rely on their land for financial gain (Koontz 2001).  
As a first step towards designing and implementing conservation programs 
compatible with a wider array of land management objectives, researchers have begun to 
consider the inter-relationship between financial and non-financial objectives in describing 
distinct groupings of landowners. At the coarsest level, landowners may be characterized 
by their utilization of land or lack thereof for production and income – often manifested as 
a distinction between foresters (Majumdar et al. 2008) or farmers (Kaplowitz and Witter 
2008) and non-operator landowners. This distinction offers an easily identifiable way of 
characterizing landowners based on external criteria, and such typologies can be somewhat 
easily distinguished using simple demographic and property characteristics (e.g. Majumdar 
et al. 2008, Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015). Yet perhaps unsurprisingly, this simple dichotomy 
appears insufficient to explain adoption of stewardship behaviors; for example, past studies 
have found non-operator residential landowners to be both more (Kaplowitz and Witter 
2008, Arbuckle et al. 2008) and less (Armstrong and Stedman 2011) likely to engage in 
stewardship behavior compared with their producer counterparts. While the inclusion of 
both producer and non-producer landowners in the land stewardship literature is an 
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important first step, it appears that such categories are somewhat fluid (Majumdar et al. 
2008) and more fine-scale description of land management objectives is needed.  
A brief (and by no means exhaustive) review of the literature highlights the 
increasing recognition of complexity associated with land ownership objectives. Kline et 
al. (2000) measured the pursuit of lifestyle amenities in addition to profit and production 
objectives to describe different types of landowners. Maybery et al. (2005) noted that many 
landowners were divided in their views of the environment, and considered environmental 
conservation as differentiating characteristic amongst landowners. More recently, Nielsen-
Pincus et al. (2015) identified five key land management considerations that could be used 
to describe landowners in the wildland-urban interface: pursuit of natural/lifestyle 
amenities, forest/timber management, home and family, agricultural production, and 
development. Below, I explore in more detail the variety of objectives theorized to 
influence producer and non-producer engagement with land stewardship initiatives. 
1.1. Producers 
Due to the large footprint and historical dominance of agricultural and forestry land 
uses in the United States, adoption of stewardship practices amongst producer landowners 
is well represented in the literature. While both farmers and foresters have expressed 
general support for environmental outcomes in a variety of contexts, past research suggests 
that perceived barriers may inhibit stewardship behavior. Napier et al. (1998) utilized 
Rogers (1983) Diffusion model to explain participation in government sponsored soil 
erosion control problems, and suggested that four key attitudes must be present in order for 
a farmer to consider enrollment: the farmer must believe that (1) a problem exists, (2) the 
costs of enrollment are reasonable, (3) the desired practices are relevant to farm operations, 
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and (4) the benefits outweigh the costs. Fischer (2012) described similar set of conditions 
necessary for engaging commodity-driven non industrial private forestlands (NIPF) 
owners in stewardship initiatives, including perception of financial benefit, marketability, 
and compatibility with their values as family forest owners. Further evidence supports the 
notions that producer enrollment is ultimately dependent on whether such practices limit 
or enhance land productivity (Woods et al. 2014), and whether or not the farmer perceives 
a self-benefit to utilizing these practices (Reimer and Prokopy 2014). Additional barriers 
to enrollment may include perception of regulatory limitations (Reimer and Prokopy 2014) 
and risk (Greiner et al. 2009). 
While the above literature provides a broad understanding of how producer 
attitudes relate to enrollment in stewardship programs, the question remains: how and why 
do producers differ in these key attitudes? Petrzelka et al. (1996) theorized that farmers can 
be split as “sustainable” or “conventional,” defined by a view of whether humans should 
dominate or harmonize with nature. Similarly, Sullivan et al. (1996) surveyed conventional 
and organic farmers, and found that farmers in both groups shared many perceived barriers 
and were not differentiated according to economic considerations, but were split by their 
views on nature. Maybery et al. (2005) equate conventional farmers with those who are 
driven primarily by economics, and sustainable farmers as those who are driven primarily 
by maintaining the farming lifestyle and closeness to nature. Greiner et al. (2009) surveyed 
ranchers in Australia and found that financial considerations did not appear to be an 
important predictor of stewardship behavior, and instead stewardship was differentiated 




The heavy focus on commercial producers fails to represent the growing presence 
of non-production oriented land management objectives represented within a typical 
watershed (Rosenberg and Margerum 2008), including small acreage hobby farmers, 
residential homeowners, and real estate investors. These groups may cumulatively have a 
large impact on the landscape; between 1950 and 2000, the amount of land in the United 
States populated at exurban densities increased five-fold, the majority of which has resulted 
as the result of conversion of agricultural and forestry lands (Brown et al. 2005). Kaplowitz 
and Witter (2008) compared non-commercial residential landowners to commercial 
producers, and found that non-commercial landowners were generally more accepting of 
their responsibility for watershed degradation and were more willing to place riparian 
buffers on their lands. Conversely, Armstrong and Stedman (2011) compared a similar 
population, and found that residential landowners were less willing to implement buffers 
due to aesthetic preferences. Such unclear relationships suggest that all non-operator 
homeowners cannot be classified into one category, and instead more fine-scale distinction 
of objectives may further elaborate stewardship behavior.  
Pannell and Wilkinson (2009) investigated residential landholders, and described 
two major objectives: those driven by environmental objectives, and those driven by 
aesthetic objectives. Similarly, Ryan (2009) differentiated non-commercial riparian 
landowners by stewardship ethic, and suggested that stewardship related to perceptions of 
personal accountability for watershed degradation and feasibility of restoration to be key 
variables. Fischer (2012) split non-producer forest landowners objectives into three 
classes: amenity (residents driven by the rural lifestyle), recreation (absentee landowners 
who utilize the property as a second home), and passive (absentee landowners without a 
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clearly defined ownership objective). The authors found that absentee landowners were 
generally less likely to actively manage their land to minimize wildlife risk likely due to 
perceptions of “inconvenience” for their limited time on their property. Petrzelka et al. 
(2009) noted a similar relationship; absentee landowners tended to report a high interest in 
conservation but exhibited low enrollment rates in conservation programs.  
1.3 Research framework 
The primary objectives of this research were to (1) test whether production 
objectives influence perceived barriers and preferred methods of engagement with 
stewardship programs, (2) classify landowners according to the relative importance of 
production and less-easily identifiable land management objectives theorized to influence 
stewardship behavior, and (3) compare how these groups differ in the aforementioned 
perceived barriers and preferred methods of engagement. According to Nielsen-Pincus et 
al. (2015), an effective landowner classification system will produce classes that are 
“readily interpretable, represent distinct suites of landowner motivations, and link those 
motivations to preferred land management strategies,” and I take a similar approach in 
defining appropriate landowner classes. Based on my literature review, I expected 
landowner typologies to be defined primarily by use of land for production purposes, with 
further refinement by consideration of other objectives such as conservation, recreation, or 
investment considerations. In general, I expected producers to perceive greater financial 
barriers to enrollment and to be more interested in receiving financial incentives compared 
with non-producers.  
Following determination of landowner typologies, I explore the distribution of 
landowners by comparing the makeup of four different sub-watersheds: the Clackamas 
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mainstem, Clear Creek, Deep Creek, and Eagle Creek. These four watersheds are 
characterized by similar sizes and land use makeup, and are difficult to distinguish from 
one another by simply looking at tax parcel data. However, I hypothesized that the 
distribution of landowner typologies may be different between subwatersheds and may 
help to target policy interventions.  
2. METHODS 
Amongst other things, the survey instrument was designed to measure land 
management objectives, property and demographic characteristics, perceived barriers to 
enrollment in stewardship programs, and preferred methods of engagement with 
stewardship programs. All analyses were performed in R Studio (Version 3.2.3). 
2.1 Land Management Objectives 
I asked respondents to rate the importance of various land management objectives 
on a 5 point Likert scale from “not at all important” to “very important.” These objectives 
included environmental, recreational, financial, and production oriented objectives. 
Though similar studies separate farmers and foresters (e.g. Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015), I 
was interested in creating groups based on the more general relationship between land use 
for production or for lifestyle, and I did not attempt to differentiated these groups from one 
another.  
To identify the underlying dimensions of land management objectives, I performed 
an exploratory factor analysis using polychoric correlations on land management 
objectives (‘Psych’ R Package, Revelle 2015) using varimax rotation. Polychoric 
correlations are a modified version of the Pearson correlation coefficient used when an 
ordinal variable is theorized to represent an underlying normally distributed variable (see 
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Drasgow 1988) as is the case with Likert-scale data. I identified three factors which I 
interpret to represent “Production” objectives (associated with the production and sale of 
farm and/or timber products), “investment” objectives (associated with maximizing return 
on investment or development potential), and “conservation” objectives (associated with 
the pursuit environmental and to a lesser extent recreational objectives) (Table 2.1).  
2.2 Production Objective Regression Models 
 In order to test if production objectives on their own could help to explain 
differences in attitude, I performed an Ordinary Least Squares regression utilizing the 
factor score from production as a predictor of each of the eight listed variables 
independent of one another (Table 2.2, “coef” column). I considered production to be a 





Univariate distributions and 3-factor solution for responses to: “How important are the following factors 
when you are making decisions regarding your land?” Percent important indicates percentage of 
respondents marking “important” or “very important.” (Factor loadings greater than 0.4 are bolded for 
emphasis). 
 




Rotated Factor Loadings 
Product. Conserv. Invest. 
Produce farm or timber products 38% 2.70 1.70 0.85 0 0.18 
Provide income 27% 2.48 1.50 0.78 0.04 0.31 
Run a business 20% 2.21 1.46 0.9 -0.01 0.3 
Provide recreational opportunities 50% 3.43 1.34 0.11 0.44 0.2 
Preserve open space 70% 3.97 1.23 -0.08 0.82 -0.05 
Protect wildlife 75% 4.14 1.04 -0.05 0.89 -0.12 
Protect local waterways 77% 4.21 1.05 0.04 0.79 0.1 
Enhance investment potential 51% 3.40 1.40 0.3 0.13 0.67 
Enhance development potential 21% 2.28 1.42 0.33 -0.05 0.72 
Eigenvalue    2.37 2.31 1.25 
% Variance explained    26% 26% 14% 
AResponses range from not at all important (1) to very important (5) 
 
2.3 Landowner Typologies 
I utilized the factor scores to perform a k-means cluster analysis to identify distinct 
groupings of landowners by land management objective. I used the R base function 
kmeans() to perform the cluster analysis using 10,000 iterations, which ultimately 
converged on a five cluster solution. I assigned each of the respondents to the appropriate 
cluster, and I calculated the mean of each measured land management objective for each 
landowner cluster (Figure 2.1) and compared them to one another to create descriptive 
landowner typologies.   
2.4 Landowner and Property Characteristics 
I queried socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, including 
education, income, political ideology, value of agricultural sales, ownership tenure, and 
age. Using ESRI ArcGIS (version 10.2), I measured the total acreage owned by each 
landowner by calculating the sum total acreage of all tax parcels registered to that 
individual within the confines of the Clackamas River watershed. Additionally, I calculated 
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the total kilometers of streams on each landowner’s property by overlaying tax parcels and 
streams identified in the USGS National Hydrography Dataset. Last, I defined four 
subwatersheds in which respondents were represented (Clackamas Mainstem, Deep Creek, 
Clear Creek, and Eagle Creek) and assigned each landowner to the watershed in which they 
had the greatest amount of property.  
2.5 Barriers to Enrollment  
 I asked respondents to rate their level of agreement (from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree” with four statements explicitly relating to reasons that would prevent them 
from enrolling in a watershed stewardship program. I chose these barriers to enrollment 
based on those shown to influence landowners in the literature: practical barriers such as 
financial limitations and time constraints (Williams 2002, Woods et al. 2014), and less 
tangible barriers relating to lack of trust (Rosenberg and Margerum 2008, Smith et al. 2013) 
and concerns for regulatory implications as a consequence of enrollment (Greiner et al. 
2009, Kallstrom and Ljung 2005, Armstrong and Stedman 2011).  
2.6 Preferred Methods of Engagement  
 I asked respondents to rate their likelihood of enrolling in a watershed stewardship 
program if (a) offered any of 6 different incentives and (b) the program involved working 
towards any of seven separate land management goals. I looked to reduce the number of 
variables represented by performing an exploratory factor analysis on each of these two 
groups, and creating indices by taking the mean of variables shown to represent an 
underlying data structure. I evaluated the internal consistency of these indices by 
calculating Chronbach’s alpha. This analysis revealed two main types of incentives: 
“financial incentives” (alpha = 0.93) and “assistance implementing project” (alpha = 0.84); 
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and two types of land management goals: “agrichemical reduction” (alpha = 0.89) and 
“riparian habitat improvements” (alpha = 0.92). 
2.7 Within Group Comparisons 
I tested both for significant differences among landowner typologies and between 
each group individually compared with all other groups combined (that is, whether each 
group tends to be significantly higher or lower than the mean of all other groups). For 
presence/absence (land use) and non-Likert ordinal (income, political tendency, and value 
of agricultural sales) data, I utilized a Chi-square test for goodness of fit. Because this test 
resulted in expected frequencies for some groups of less than 5, I utilized Monte Carlo p-
value simulations with 2000 replicates to create more conservative and accurate 
representations of significance. I tested for differences in continuous data (age, ownership 
tenure, log(property size), and log(stream length on property)) by running an analysis of 
variance test (ANOVA).  For Likert scale ordinal data (barriers and preferred methods of 
engagement), I compared differences in means among groups by utilizing an ANOVA. I 
tested for differences between groups by utilizing a Mann-Whitney U test, a non-
parametric test that holds no assumption of normality and performs with almost equal 
efficiency to the student’s t-test.  
3. RESULTS 
Seventy-two surveys (6.5%) were returned as undeliverable, leading to an effective 
sample of 958. I received 268 responses with sufficient data to complete the cluster 
analysis, representing 28% of the sample. Because the population contained both rural 
residential and agricultural properties, I compared demographics and property 
characteristics from respondents to both the most recent National Agricultural Statistics 
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Service Census of Agriculture (USDA 2012) for Clackamas County and the most recent 
American Community Survey (US Census Bureau 2009-2013) for census tracts 
represented in the study area. Compared with these two data sources, the sample tended to 
be older (median age 63) and more educated (48% with a college degree). Property size, 
agricultural sales, gender, and income tended to fall within the range of values represented 
by the reference sources.  
 Goals relating to conservation were the top land management objectives and 
included “preserve open space” (mean = 3.97), “protect wildlife” (mean = 4.14), and 
“protect local waterways” (mean = 4.21). “Provide recreational opportunities” (mean = 
3.43) and “enhance investment potential” (mean = 3.4) were also widely reported. 
production-oriented goals such as “produce farm or timber products” (mean = 2.70), 
“provide income” (mean = 2.48), and “run a business” (mean = 2.21) were less frequently 
reported, but had the highest standard deviations, reflecting the mixed sample of both 
producers and non-producers. “Enhance development potential” (mean = 2.28) was also 
infrequently reported (Table 2.1).  
 Respondents tended to agree that “regulatory barriers” (mean = 3.71) were the 
greatest obstacle to enrollment in stewardship programs, followed by “trust barriers” (mean 
= 3.31), “financial barriers” (mean = 3.20), and “time barriers” (mean = 3.1). Respondents 
were generally ambivalent regarding the potential to receive “financial incentives” (mean 
= 3.19), “assistance implementing project” (mean = 2.95), and to work towards 
“fertilizer/pesticide reduction” (mean = 3.13). Respondents tended to most agree that they 







 The factor scores for production objectives were negatively associated with the 
perception of all barriers, and were particularly strongly associated with the perception of 
Regulatory and Trust Barriers (p < 0.01).  Furthermore, production objectives were weakly 
negatively associated with interest in pursuing fertilizer/pesticide reduction goals (p<0.1) 
(Table 2.2). 
4. LANDOWNER TYPOLOGIES  
 The cluster analysis revealed five distinct landowner typologies, named according 
to the importance each group placed on production, investment, and conservation 
objectives (Figure 2.1). Two typologies reported particularly low production scores and 
can be classified as non-producers: “Lifestyle Homeowners” (n = 69) and “Amenity 
Investors” (n = 47). Two typologies reported particularly high production scores and can 
be classified as producers: “Lifestyle Producers” (n = 53) and “High-value Producers” (n 
= 46). The two non-producer typologies and the two producer typologies tended to respond 
more similarly to one another compared with responses between producers and non-
producers. A fifth group, “Disengaged Landholders” (n = 53), reported low scores for all 
three listed objectives and tended to be the most distinct group in terms of mean response. 
These differences in land management objectives translated into differences among groups 
regarding whether they tended to agree (>3), disagree (<3), or be neutral (~3) to each of 
the perceived barriers and preferred methods of program engagement (Figure 2.2). In the 
following sections, I describe each of these groups in more detail and attempt to interpret 





Mean land management objectives and standard error bars compared between clusters. Primary factor 
loading indicates the top factor on which each variable loaded onto.  
 
4.1 Non-Producer Typologies 
Non-producer typologies tended to report low production (mean < 2) and high 
conservation scores (mean > 4), and tended to have smaller property sizes, report fewer 
agricultural or forestry land uses on their land, and report little to no agricultural sales from 
their property. Additionally, these two groups were the most likely typologies to reside on 
their property (>90%). These non-producer typologies tended to perceive fewer barriers to 
enrollment in stewardship programs and were generally more interested in working with a 
stewardship program on the listed land management strategies. They were the only two 
groups to not perceive time barriers to enrollment (mean < 3). However, Lifestyle 
Homeowners and Amenity Investors were differentiated by their views of their property as 
an investment; an objective which seems to weakly influence how these groups perceive 





Land use, demographic, and parcel characteristics compared between landowner clusters. All data come 
from survey responses except for Property Size and Stream Length, which were calculated using ArcGIS. 
 ALL 
Landowner Clusters 
LH AI LP HP DL 
ALand Use       
Primary Residence*** 82% 94%↑ 91%↑ 81% 74% 68%↓ 
Agriculture*** 39% 26%↓ 9%↓ 66%↑ 65%↑ 32% 
Timber*** 43% 28%↓ 26%↓ 62%↑ 57%↑ 47% 
Pasture** 33% 35% 15%↓ 43%↑ 41% 28% 
AQualitiative Respondent Characteristics       
Income > $100K (n=220) 37% 33% 35% 37% 46% 35% 
Liberal Political Tendency (n=230)*** 27% 46%↑ 20% 29% 20% 17%↓ 
Conservative Political Tendency (n=230)*** 48% 32%↓ 43% 51% 55% 65%↑ 
2014 Sales < $50,000 (n=257)*** 32% 22%↓ 9%↓ 62%↑ 42% 29% 
2014 Sales > $50,000 (n=257)*** 9% 2%↓ 4% 6% 28%↑ 10% 
BQuantitative Respondent Characteristics       
Age (mean years, n=241)  63.3 62.1 62.5 64.1 62.6 65.3 
1Ownership Tenure (mean years, n=247)** 27.6 28.0 21.6↓ 33.7 30.7 34.4↑ 
2Property Size (mean acres, n=266)*** 27.0 14.0↓ 11.9↓ 40.7↑ 41.3↑ 31.7 
Property Size (median acres, n=266) 12.4 8.6 6.1 24.1 22.3 18.4 
2,3Stream Length (mean km, n=266)*** 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.4↑ 
Stream Length (median km, n=266) 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9 
Notes: 1Represents only ownership < 80 years to correct for outliers in data. 2Significance levels refer to 
test on log-transformed data to correct for non-normality. 3Significant levels refer to only properties with 
streams on site. 
LH = Lifestyle Homeowners, AI = Amenity Investors, LP = Lifestyle Producers, IP = High-value Producers, DL 
= Disengaged Landholders 
A All tests in section run with chi square test using Monte Carlo p-value simulations (2000 replicates). 
B All tests in section run using ANOVA 
*significant within group differences at the <0.1 level, **at the <0.05 level; ***at the <0.01 level 
↑significantly higher at <0.05 level compared with all other groups combined 
↓significantly lower at <0.05 level compared with all other groups combined 
 
4.1.1 Lifestyle Homeowners (n = 69, 26%) 
Lifestyle Homeowners were the largest and generally the most enthusiastic group 
about program enrollment, and they perceived significantly fewer trust barriers (mean = 
2.84) and time barriers (mean = 2.81) than any other group. Additionally, this group is the 
only landowner cluster that tended to be more politically liberal (46%) than conservative 
(22%), a characteristic that firmly distinguishes them from Amenity Investors. While 
respondents in this group are classified as “non-producers,” there were some reported 
agricultural (26%), timber (28%), and pasture (35%) land uses, and 24% of this group 
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reported some (primarily low value) agricultural sales in 2014. Therefore, production is 
not excluded as a land use amongst these landowners, but it seems likely that production-
oriented land uses are recreationally-driven.  
4.1.2 Amenity Investors (n = 47, 18%) 
 Amenity Investors are characterized by somewhat higher recreational (~4) and 
investment land management objectives (3-4) compared with Lifestyle Homeowners. They 
responded similarly to Lifestyle Homeowners regarding perceived barriers and preferred 
methods of program engagement, but tended to report somewhat higher Trust Barriers 
(mean = 3.14) and a greater interest in receiving financial incentives (mean = 3.38). They 
were least likely landowner group to report agricultural (9%) or pasture (15%) land uses, 
and were also the least likely to report any agricultural sales (13%). However, 
approximately 26% of this group reported Timber as a land use of their property, indicating 
that a portion of this group may represent non-industrial private forestland owners (NIPF) 
who may not actively manage their land for timber, but instead reserve the potential for 
future timber harvest on their property. They had the shortest ownership tenure of any 
group (mean = 21.6 years).  
4.2 Producer Typologies 
The two producer typologies were differentiated from other typologies primarily 
by their high production scores and frequent agricultural and timber land uses. They tended 
to own the largest properties (median > 22 acres) and reported the highest frequency of 
agricultural sales (~70%). Both typologies tended to perceive more regulatory, trust, and 
time barriers to enrollment compared with non-producer typologies. Additionally, where 
non-producer typologies tended not to perceive financial barriers, producers weakly 
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reported the perception of financial barriers (Lifestyle Producers mean = 3.41; High-value 
Producers mean = 3.25). I did not detect a difference between interest in incentives between 
producer and non-producer typologies; however, producers tended to be less interested in 
the listed land management strategies compared with non-producers. The two classes of 




A) Perceived barriers to enrollment in hypothetical watershed stewardship program among landowner 
typologies. Scale ranges from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The center line indicates neither 
agree nor disagree (3).  
B) Likelihood that listed incentives and goals would increase enrollment in hypothetical watershed 
stewardship program among landowner typologies. Scale ranges from very unlikely (1) to very likely (5). 
The center line indicates neither likely nor unlikely (3).  
Significance levels on plot titles refer to results of ANOVA among all clusters for that variable. Significance 
levels on error bars within plots refer to results of Mann-Whitney U Test of that group compared with all 
other groups combined. To the right indicates significantly higher, whereas to the left indicates 
significantly lower.  
*significant at the <0.1 level, **at the <0.05 level, ***at the <0.01 level 
LH = Lifestyle Homeowners, AI = Amenity Investors, LP = Lifestyle Producers, IP = High-value Producers, DL 





4.2.1 Lifestyle Producers (n = 53, 20%) 
 Lifestyle Producers are differentiated from High-value Producers by their low 
investment scores, marginally lower production scores, and marginally higher conservation 
scores. This group was the most likely group to report low-value agricultural sales (62% < 
$50,000), and was highly unlikely to report high value agricultural sales (6% > $50,000). 
They tended to be somewhat more interested in fertilizer/pesticide reduction (mean = 3.17) 
and substantially more interested in pursuing riparian habitat improvements (mean = 3.9) 
compared with High-value producers. These individuals appear to represent low-value 
producers who are motivated more by maintaining a rural lifestyle compared with 
maximizing returns through their land management.  
4.2.2 High-value Producers (n = 46, 17%) 
 High-value Producers are characterized by high scores for all three objectives 
(mean > 4), and they were the most likely group to report high value agricultural sales 
(28% > $50,000). They were most strongly differentiated from Lifestyle Producers by 
consideration of their property for development potential (>4), and were less strongly 
differentiated by a marginally higher investment score. They tended to be disinterested in 
fertilizer/pesticide reduction (mean = 2.91) and marginally interested in pursuing riparian 
habitat improvements (mean = 3.49). While this group values the recreational and 
conservation aspects of landownership, they emphasize strong monetary motivations, and 
their land management is likely to be ultimately influenced by whatever brings top dollar.  
4.3 Disengaged Landholders (n = 53, 20%) 
I identified one group – Disengaged Landholders – that was difficult to classify 
according to land management objective as they reported low scores for all three listed 
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objectives (mean scores < 3). Though this group reported low production scores, it was 
difficult to label them as “non-producers” because this group was somewhat likely to report 
agricultural (32%), timber (47%), and pasture (28%) land uses, and about half of this group 
(49%) reported agricultural sales. This group is difficult to identify according to readily 
available property or demographic characteristics, as they tended to fall somewhere 
between producers and non-producers in terms of income and property size, and were only 
marginally older than the other groups (mean age = 65.3 years, not significant). However, 
three characteristics indicate that this group represents a distinct subset of landowners: they 
were the least likely group to reside on their property (68%), tended to report significantly 
longer ownership tenures compared with other groups (mean = 34.4 years), and they were 
by far the most politically conservative group (mean = 65%).  
4.4 Distribution of Landowner Typologies   
I found no significant difference in the frequency of each cluster represented in 
each subwatershed, but I did find a significant difference in relative percentage of stream 
lengths represented between each watershed; Lifestyle Homeowners tend to dominate 
Eagle Creek (35% of streams) and Deep Creek (30% of streams), whereas  Disengaged 
Landholders tend to dominate Clear Creek (35% of streams) and the Clackamas Mainstem 
(25% of streams) (Figure 2.3). The percentage of stream kilometers represented tended to 
be more even in the Clackamas Mainstem, which is geographically between Deep/Eagle 
Creek and Clear Creek, showing a general increase in representation of conservation scores 





Proportion of stream length represented by each landowner cluster in each subwatershed (Chisq 
p=0.0.0035). Inset maps identify subwatershed boundaries within the Clackamas River watershed.  
LH = Lifestyle Homeowners, AI = Amenity Investors, LP = Lifestyle Producers, IP = High-value Producers, DL 
= Disengaged Landholders 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Landowners within the Clackamas River watershed demonstrated a diversity of 
objectives, and this diversity translated into differences in perceived barriers and preferred 
methods of engagement with stewardship programs. The relationship between land 
management objectives and land stewardship is not new; Kline et al. (2000), Majumdar et 
al. (2009), Fischer (2012), and others have come to similar conclusions. However, my 
research adds clarity to the relationship between land management objective and 
stewardship by (1) providing evidence that production objectives act as the dominant 
variable relating to one’s interest in land stewardship, (2) suggesting that one’s 
consideration of conservation and investment objectives moderate the influence of 
production considerations, and (3) identifying the importance of disengaged landowners as 
a small but potentially influential group who may require special policy interventions to 





5.1 Land Management Objective and Stewardship 
As suggested by Koontz (2001), I expected that production objective would 
correspond with greater financial barriers and greater interest in receiving financial 
incentives. However, I found only marginal differences between producers and non-
producers relating to interest in incentives and no differences relating to perceived financial 
barriers. Instead, producers differed from non-producers primarily in their greater 
perception of barriers relating to trust, regulatory concerns, and perceived lack of time. 
This may be explained by the fact that producers, regardless of ultimate financial motive, 
are fundamentally in the business of managing land, whereas watershed stewardship 
programs are in the business of changing land management behaviors. Therefore, 
enrollment in a watershed stewardship program represents more than a single act; instead, 
it represents a commitment to change long-standing behaviors.  
Though few if any studies have compared perceptions of trust and concerns for 
regulation between producer and non-producer typologies, I detected strong differences 
between these groups in regards to these variables. The literature has mostly been silent on 
these concepts amongst non-producers, but various authors have long suggested that lack 
of trust and regulatory concerns can be important barriers amongst producers. Sullivan et 
al. (1996) emphasized a widely reported lack of trust in the government amongst a diverse 
group of farmers, and Harrison et al. (1998) emphasized that a common reason for lack of 
trust related to farmers feeling excluded from meaningful engagement with conservation 
programs. Kallstrom and Ljung (2005) found a widespread concern amongst farmers that 
heightened regulation would threaten their ability to continue farming. Similarly, Greiner 
et al. (2009) equated regulatory concerns as a primary risk factor for ranchers to engage 
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with conservation agencies. One respondent described that these concepts of trusts and 
concerns for regulation are in fact closely related; “As for trust in governmental 
organizations, mandates and burdens by the state legislature and appointed committees 
consisting of people who own no forest land and do not understand those who do, bothers 
me greatly." A common underlying theme amongst all of these findings is that producers 
feel policy makers cannot be trusted to represent their unique goals and needs.  
Contrary to suggestions that producers can be split into “sustainable” and 
“conventional” (Maybery et al. 2005) categories based on land management objective, my 
findings suggest that producers were perhaps more effectively differentiated according to 
consideration of their property’s investment potential. Lifestyle Producers” and “High-
value Producers” reported only modest differences in conservation score, but were starkly 
differentiated in their investment scores. These differences translated into a greater interest 
in pursuing fertilizer/pesticide reduction goals and riparian habitat improvements amongst 
Lifestyle Producers. This may be due to the fact that riparian restoration activities and 
fertilizer/pesticide reduction may be associated with decreases in land productivity. While 
Lifestyle Producers may be more accepting of such strategies because such losses in 
productivity are unlikely to diminish their ability to continue their farming lifestyle, High-
value Producers may be concerned by the potential loss in profitability.  
Past studies have tended to consider non-producers to be motivated primarily by 
lifestyle objectives (Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015, Fischer 2012); while I found this to be true 
for both Amenity Investors and Lifestyle Homeowners, the data suggest that non-producers 
may exhibit more diversity in objective than previously described as these groups were 
divided by their interest in utilizing their property for investment and development 
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purposes. However, this diversity did not translate into substantial differences in response, 
as these two groups reported only minor differences in perceptions of Trust Barriers. It is 
likely that further data relating to more investment-specific land use considerations are 
needed to help understand if and how these landowner groups differ.   
5.2 The Special Case of Disengaged Landholders 
Disengaged Landowners were difficult to describe and even more difficult to 
understand as they reported a wide diversity of land uses, were generally the most negative 
group, and yet were characterized by a general lack of strong land management objectives. 
This group may represent an important new grouping that is less easily characterized by 
the traditional concepts of land ownership objectives. It is possible that this group 
represents “non-cooperators,” individuals averse to stewardship programs in general who 
tend to disagree with all statements. Finley et al. (2006) observed a similar group of forest 
landowners in a survey of landowner interest in working with neighbors on stewardship 
objectives. Similarly, Kline et al. (2000) described a group of “passive [forestland] owners” 
who were motivated primarily by the gratification of property ownership but were not 
motivated to engage in active land management. Most likely, additional research is needed 
to accurately represent the land ownership objectives of this group; some potential land 
management objectives that we did not measure may include a high value of independence 
(Sullivan et al. 1996, Greiner at al. 2009) or pursuit of peace and quiet (Maybery et al. 
2005, Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015). 
Notably, Disengaged Landholders were characterized by high rates of political 
conservatism (65%). This partly explains this groups lack of interest in enrollment; past 
decades have seen increasing polarization in political ideology regarding support for 
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environmental programs, with conservatives tending to lack support (Nielsen-Pincus et al. 
2014).  While political ideology may be an important consideration of this group, this 
variable may be difficult to consider when establishing initial relationships with 
landowners; therefore, it is important to consider more readily available demographic 
information.  
There were two defining demographic features of this group that may help to 
explain the observed trends – they were the least likely group to reside on their property, 
and they were the group with the longest mean ownership tenure. The high rate of absentee 
landownership may partially explain the generally negative attitudes and high barriers 
perceived by this group; Creighton et al. (2002) suggested that lack of on-site residence of 
a similar population may have led to a diminished sense of place and subsequent lack of 
stewardship ethic. Bourassa (1991) described the concept of the non-resident as the 
“detached outsider” who is more concerned with visual aesthetics and less concerned about 
emotional or symbolic aspects of place.  
This phenomenon is typically used to describe visitors and not landowners, and it 
does not fit well with my observation that Disengaged Landholders tended to report the 
longest ownership tenure of any group. This fact, coupled with the high rate of absentee 
landownership and the high average age of Disengaged Landholders, could indicate that 
many of these individuals are long-time landowners who are no longer able to reside on 
and/or actively manage their property, and instead they may be legacy landholders who are 
uninterested in actively pursuing any active management objectives on their property. This 
description certainly does not describe all landholders in this group, as this group 
represented a large range of demographic and parcel characteristics, and it appears likely 
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that a far greater combination of explanatory variables explain the trends observed in this 
group.  
The very recognition of this group is particularly important as they were the 
dominant landowner type in two subwatersheds and tend to be highly negative and offer 
few signals for preferred methods of engagement, if any, with stewardship programs. They 
tended to be highly uninterested in receiving technical or educational assistance, and were 
close to neutral regarding interest in receiving financial incentives. This may correspond 
with findings from Fisher (2012), who noted that a group of absentee forestland owners 
tended to view fuel treatments as inconvenient. She suggests offering third party 
contractors to perform on-site work, which may decrease the burden associated with 
stewardship.  
5.3 Landowner Targeting  
Majumdar et al. (2009) and Nielsen-Pincus (2015) stress the importance of having 
information about landowner typology demographics, parcel characteristics, and location 
to help policy makers target policy interventions. My research further shows the 
practicality of this concept – to an extent. While I noted substantial differences in property 
characteristics between non-producers and producers/absentee landowners, I was unable 
to identify easily recognizable demographic and parcel characteristics between more 
specific landowner typologies. Such easily recognizable traits alone would be unable to 
identify the divide in attitude between Lifestyle Homeowners and Amenity Investors, as 
well as the divide between Lifestyle Producers and High-value Producers. However, this 
may suggest that a good starting place to discuss land stewardship may be to first gain an 
understanding of an individual’s land management objectives. 
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Contrary to Nielsen-Pincus et al. (2015), I did not detect significant differences 
between landowner frequencies between different subwatersheds. However, I did find 
differences in the portion of stream that each landowner typology represented. This may 
be an even more important metric, as it suggests that Eagle Creek and Deep Creek may be 
particularly fruitful areas to focus on stream intervention due to the large portion of stream 
represented by Lifestyle Homeowners, whereas Clear Creek may be a less cost effective 
area for restoration due to the heavy presence of Disengaged Landowners.  
Each of these sub-watersheds contain similar makeups of agricultural, forestry, and 
residential land uses, but face different water quality stressors. Data regarding landowner 
typologies can be coupled with existing information regarding concerns in the watershed 
to help policy makers to prioritize areas for intervention. The Clackamas sub-basin Total 
Maximum Daily Load (DEQ 2006) listed water quality standard exceedances for bacteria 
in the Clackamas Mainstem, Deep Creek, and Clear Creek watersheds, and exceedance for 
temperature in the Clackamas Mainstem and Eagle Creek watersheds. The current 
Clackamas Agricultural Water Quality Management Plan (ODA 2015) specified that Deep 
Creek is the top priority for agri-chemical reductions in the watershed, followed by Eagle 
and Clear Creeks. This suggests that watershed stewardship programs may want to start 
initiatives focused on riparian restoration and shade provisioning amongst the relatively 
liberal and engaged Lifestyle Homeowners in Eagle Creek; another initiative may focus on 
septic system upgrades amongst Lifestyle Homeowners to address bacterial loadings in 
Deep Creek; and a third initiative may focus on working with the relative high frequency 
of Lifestyle Producers in the Clackamas mainstem. While limiting program interventions 
to these areas are unlikely to achieve significant improvements in water quality, these 
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suggestions offer strong starting places by which to establish a reputation, build trust, and 
achieve early on the ground program successes.  
5. CONCLUSION 
 
My findings lead to four primary conclusions: (1) land management objectives may 
be closely related to engagement with stewardship programs; (2) production objectives act 
as a master variable that is moderated by conservation and investment objectives, (3) some 
landowners are more easily classified according to a general lack of interest as opposed to 
strong land management objective, and (4) financial incentives are of limited utility 
amongst all described landowner typologies. 
1. As suggested by Nielsen-Pincus et al. (2015), I was able to detect 5 distinct 
landowner clusters with distinct motivations for land management that were readily 
interpretable and were able to be linked with differences in preferred land 
management strategies. However, my findings suggest that some diversity in land 
management objective is difficult to predict by simply observing demographic and 
land use characteristics. Further research (similar to Sullivan et al. 1996) is needed 
to examine whether differences in land management objective translates into on-
the-ground conservation action.  
2. Landowners differentiated by production objective (e.g. producers and non-
producers) tended to be consistently different from one another in terms of mean 
response, whereas investment and conservation objectives provided less strong 
differentiations between groups. However, this divide in production consideration 
does not correspond to divide in perception of financial barriers or interest in 
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financial incentives (contrary Koontz 2001); instead, I found less tangible 
differences of opinion relating to lack of trust and concern for regulation.  
3. Some landowners (e.g. disengaged landholders) are not easily classified according 
to traditional concepts of land ownership objective; additional research is needed 
to understand the objectives driving land ownership in this group.  
4. Financial barriers were weakly perceived and financial incentives were weakly 
desired across all landowner typologies. This general lack of interest in the financial 
aspects of watershed stewardship supports critiques (Engel et al. 2008, Pirard et al. 
2010) and findings (Greiner et al. 2009, Ma et al. 2010) regarding the limited utility 
of incentives to encourage widespread adoption of stewardship behavior. 
In conclusion, I make the fairly obvious but important claim that the first 
consideration for engaging with landowners should be to understand their ultimate 
objectives for land ownership, as this may provide a tremendous amount of insight into 
their needs preferred methods of engagement. Identifying landowner typologies is an 
important exercise in demonstrating the diversity of objectives represented in a watershed, 





 I have spent the last two years pouring over journal articles, crunching numbers, 
and staring into space trying to make sense of a jumble of data. While navigating through 
the scholarship of it all, it can be difficult to forget that this research is not about “Amenity 
Investors,” or “Lifestyle Producers,” or even landowners at all. It is fundamentally about 
people, real people, who have their own unique stories and perspectives on land 
stewardship. If there is one thing that I have learned, it is people cannot be neatly classified, 
and behavior cannot be cleanly explained. The best that we can do is to try to acknowledge 
this diversity in the experience of land ownership so that, as policy makers and resource 
managers, we can better conserve the land and serve the people connected to it.  
 This work challenged me and my worldview. I am a longtime outdoorsman; a 
fisherman, a backpacker, a climber, a paddler. I am also a longtime environmentalist, and 
I thought my perspectives on what it meant to steward the land were set. I have enjoyed an 
occasional trip into the Clackamas River watershed to fish, or to hike along the Clackamas 
River trail, or to get away from the noise and people so inescapable at my home in Portland. 
My relationship with the Clackamas, and with nature in general, is one primarily of 
recreation. I head into rural places when I want to escape the city; I leave when I am 
finished. As a consequence, I have never come to know a piece of land, its changes with 
the season, and its connections to the surrounding landscape like the people who live on it. 
I don’t know what it’s like to rely on a piece of land for my livelihood or my lifestyle or 
my identity, and I don’t know what it’s like to have such an integral part of my self  be 
subjected to regulation, non-profit intervention, and downstream interests. I have been 
humbled to hear from people who do. Almost all respondents reported high “conservation 
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objectives” for their land, and almost all demonstrated an understanding of the relationship 
between healthy ecosystems and clean water. But while these might be my only objectives, 
landowners must balance these objectives with sometimes conflicting values, and they are 
faced with hard choices about how to responsibly manage their land.  
Policy makers have long addressed rural land management issues with an 
oversimplified notion that people are both limited by and motivated by money, and the 
payments for environmental services framework has partly grown out of this concept.  
Resounding throughout my work is a finding that finances are not a primary barrier to land 
stewardship in the Clackamas watershed, and accordingly financial incentives are not a 
panacea to accomplish water quality objectives. Instead, a common theme that emerged 
was that individuals were limited more by a lack of trust and a general feeling that 
stewardship initiatives were incompatible with their lifestyle. To say that money is not a 
concern would be foolish; money talks, and we all operate within the confines of what 
money allows. However, to say that money can be directly translated into stewardship 
outcomes would be downright wrong. Financial incentives are necessary to overcome those 
final hurdles to land stewardship, but what is really needed are human connections, 
common goals, and a more broad-scale understanding of the inter-connectedness of all who 
live, work, and rely on the Clackamas River watershed. These are the building blocks on 
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APPENDIX B. DATA SUMMARY REPORT 
This report was prepared for the Clackamas River Water Providers and was submitted in 
January of 2015. It presents raw data and general trends noted in the survey, and is 

























































































APPENDIX C. INTERNAL REVIEW BOARD HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL 
 
 
